Freewill and Parallel-selves

Freewill and Parallel-selves

One misconception about the Everett approach is that new worlds are created every time we make a decision or toss a coin. Decoherence theory shows that this is false.

In 2006, German physicist Harald Atmanspacher argued that there is little evidence that quantum events in the brain effect consciousness (Atmanspacher, 2006). This is because standard accounts show that the experience of qualia are correlated with neuronal assemblies, formed from several thousands of coupled neurons. The superpositional qualities of objects this large are suppressed by decoherence and so our mental representations are described classically.

If we focus on single components of neuronal assemblies then it is more likely that quantum behaviour can occur. In 1992, Australian physicists Friedrich Beck and John Eccles argued that the process of exocytosis can be described as a quantum mechanical event (Beck and Eccles, pp.11357-11361). Exocytosis, refers to the process of sending neural information through a chemical synapse, is triggered by a nerve impulse that arrives in accordance with a small probability. Beck and Eccles showed that this corresponds to quantum, rather than thermodynamic, statistics and argued that these quantum events offer "a natural explanation for voluntary movements caused by mental intentions without violating physical conservation laws" (Beck and Eccles, pp.11361). It is our conscious will that increases the probability of the interaction.

Whether or not Beck and Eccles are correct, there is no evidence that parallel worlds are created because we make decisions, there is only one physical possibility, the one we choose. If there is a world where a parallel version of yourself is committing some kind of action that you find abhorrent then you would have to have branched much earlier and led a very different life. Our future-selves will diverge in time just as identical twins do. If you do not accept this, then you will have to decide where to draw the line between people and it could then be argued that you are every possible person and all of them are you.

If we accept that our choices are not determined by quantum necessity, then they must obey the classical laws of cause and effect. This means that if we knew all of the natural laws and the entire physical state of a person's brain, we would be able to determine what they would do in any given situation. If we knew everything of the multiverse, then we would be able to predict the future of every conscious mind. American neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet exhibited this idea in a series of experiments conducted in 1985 (Libet, 1985, pp.529-566).

Libet found that the brain begins initiating a voluntary act "about 400 msec. [a msec is a thousandth of a second] before the appearance of the conscious will to act" (Libet, 1999, pp.50). In 2008, German neurophysiologist John-Dylan Haynes and colleagues showed that you can predict a person's free choice up to ten seconds before they are aware of what they will do (Soon et al., pp.543). This appears to show that we do not make conscious decisions freely, however Libet did not accept this because there is a 100 msec. interval when we can choose to veto the action. This is after it has been initiated by the brain but before it has actually been carried out. This option is not available to people who appear to act against their will, such as addicts or people with physical compulsions, and so the appearance of this option provides a good definition of when someone is acting freely. Libet concluded that because we never freely choose to initiate an act, moral systems that punish us for impure thoughts "create a physiologically insurmountable moral and psychological difficulty" (Libet, 1999, pp.54).

Libet's belief that we can freely choose to veto an action is based on the idea that this choice is not itself the product of unconscious activity. He stated that "the awareness of the decision to veto could be thought to require preceding unconscious processes, but the content of that awareness (the actual decision to veto) is a separate feature that need not have the same requirement" (Libet, 1999, pp.52). Libet was reluctant to accept a material theory of the mind because he believed that it cannot explain the subjective nature of consciousness and contradicts our belief in free will. Libet argued that we instinctively believe we have free will, and this belief forms "a fundamental basis for views of our human nature" (Libet, 1999, pp.55). Free will is required in order to show that people are responsible for their actions, and our systems of justice and desert are based upon this fact.

Libet's first concern may be resolved by adopting a many minds approach to quantum mechanics and by 1954, English philosopher Alfred Jules Ayer had shown that determinism is not incompatible with free will because the two are not mutually exclusive (Ayer, pp.110-118). In order to be held morally responsible for our actions, Ayer argued that we must be acting consistently with our character and this implies that our behaviour is, to an extent, predictable. He stated that "from the fact that my action is causally determined it does not necessarily follow that I am constrained to do it: and this is equivalent to saying that it does not necessarily, follow that I am not free" (Ayer, pp.115). Because it is inconsistent to contrast free will with causality Ayer argued that it should instead be contrasted with constraint.

This can be illustrated with a simple analogy; imagine that an electronic device is implanted in your brain without your knowledge. The device makes it so that the only fruit you can pick up when you go to the supermarket are apples. When you get there you may freely choose to pick up apples and so the electronic device would not be activated to coerce you. It is fully determined that you will do this however, because had you not chosen to, then the device would have forced you. Yet despite this determinism your choice was made freely.

According to Ayer, our free choices will always coincide with the determined result and so there is no need for an actual device to force us into action. Ayer stated that "the fact that my action may nevertheless have a cause is…irrelevant. For it is not when my action has any cause at all, but only when it has a special sort of cause, that it is reckoned not to be free" (Ayer, pp.116). Ayer argued that people make the mistake of contrasting free will with causality because they falsely believe that causality means "one event is somehow in the power of another" (Ayer, pp.117).

In 1990, Australian neurophysiologists Simon Gandevia and K. Ammon showed that it is possible to influence someone's free choices by stimulating frontal regions of their brain (Ammon and Gandevia, pp.705-707) and Spanish neurophysiologist Alvaro Pascual-Leone and colleagues found similar results in 1992 (Brasil-Neto et al., pp.964-966).

In 2002, American psychologist Daniel Wegner argued that free will can be understood an illusion generated by the brain (Wegner, 2003). Like English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, Wegner argued that this is due to our inability to obtain a complete knowledge of our own mind. This idea leads to the question of whether we would be able to choose to act differently were we to somehow made aware of what our future actions will be. This question invokes a paradox because if we could choose to act differently, then we would not have accurately predicted our behaviour in the first place.

References

Ammon, K. and Gandevia, S.C., 1990, 'Transcranial magnetic stimulation can influence the selection of motor programmes', Journal of Neurology, Vol.53

Atmanspacher, H., 2006, 'Quantum Approaches to Consciousness', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Ayer, A. J., 1997, 'Freedom and Necessity', Free Will, Pereboom, D. (ed.), Hackett Publishing, Indiana

Beck, F. and Eccles, J.C., 1992, 'Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness', Biophysics, Vol.89

Brasil-Neto, J.P., et al., 1992, 'Focal transcranial magnetic stimulation and response bias in a forced-choice task', Journal of Neurology, Vol.55

Libet, B., 1985, 'Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action', Behavioural and Brain Sciences, Vol.8

Libet, B., 1999, 'Do We Have Free Will?', Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 6, pp.47-57

Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J. and Haynes, J.D., 2008, 'Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain', Nature Neuroscience, Vol.11

Wegner, D., 2003, 'The Illusion of Conscious Will', MIT Press, Cambridge